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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, I investigate the association between overconfidence, a cognitive bias of chief executive officers 
(CEOs), and the existence of internal control weaknesses (ICWs). As suggested in the prior finance literature on the 
negative impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate policy, overconfident CEOs could disregard the importance of 
internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), which could negatively affect the firm’s investment for 
infrastructure to implement effective financial reporting information system (FRIS) and result in less reliable 
financial information. Empirical test results show that CEO overconfidence is positively associated with the 
existence of ICWs, particularly with ICWs related to insufficient accounting personnel or ineffective FRIS. Those 
ICWs subsequently lead to lower earnings quality, higher absolute value of discretionary accruals and lower quality 
of accruals. Furthermore, potentially negative consequences of CEO overconfidence to the effectiveness of ICFR 
could downgrade investors’ confidence in the credibility of financial statements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n this study, I investigate how CEO overconfidence, a cognitive bias, influences the effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) using disclosures of internal control weaknesses 
(ICWs) under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Since the enactment of SOX, 
accounting academics have rigorously investigated a variety of issues (e.g., economic determinants of the existence 
of ICWs) related to internal control disclosure requirements under SOX Section 302 or 404 (see Schneider et al. 
(2009) for a review). Given that management is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective ICFR, a 
CEO’s characteristics, such as personality and educational background, are likely perceived as critical to 
establishing and maintaining such internal controls. However, prior literature primarily investigates the 
characteristics of firms that disclose ICWs. Little research exists on the relationship between a CEO’s characteristics 
and the effectiveness of ICFR. Thus, this study fills the gap by examining the association between a CEO’s personal 
characteristics such as overconfidence and the disclosure of ICWs. 
 
Under SOX Section 302, CEOs are responsible for establishing and maintaining effective ICFR, are required to 
evaluate the effectiveness of ICFR, and must report any identified internal control deficiencies on a quarterly basis.1 
In addition, SOX Section 404(a) requires CEOs to evaluate, and provide an annual management report on the 
effectiveness of their firms’ ICFR. Simultaneously, without regard to the management report, under SOX Section 
404(b), the firm’s external auditor is required to independently evaluate the effectiveness of its client’s ICFR and 
issue an annual report with its opinion on this effectiveness.2 Since the adoption of the disclosure requirement on 
ICFR effectiveness, a variety of relevant studies have been conducted. Several studies (e.g., Ogneva et al., 2007; 
Chan et al., 2009; Ashbaugh-Skife et al., 2009) show that ICWs produce lower financial reporting quality, such as 
                                                
1 Section 302 became effective in August 2002. 
2 Section 404 became effective for accelerated filers from the fiscal year beginning on or after November 15, 2004. Although non- non-
accelerated filers have complied with Section 404(a) from the fiscal year beginning on or after December 15, 2007, Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 permanently exempted non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b), internal control audits (U.S. 
House of Representatives 2010). 
I 
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higher absolute discretionary accruals and cost of equity. This result suggests that ICFR effectiveness is one of the 
most important factors affecting firms’ financial reporting quality. A few studies empirically investigate the 
economic determinants that affect the existence of ICWs using a sample of firms that disclosed ICWs under SOX 
Sections 302 and/or 404. For instance, Doyle et al. (2007a) and Ashbaugh-Skife et al. (2007) find that firms that 
have smaller size, greater financial risk, a complex operating environment, faster growth, and recent restructuring 
are more likely to have ICWs after controlling for factors that affect the disclosure of the identified ICWs. By 
expanding on prior studies that examine the factors that affect the existence of ICWs, in this study, I test the 
association between CEO overconfidence and the existence of ICWs, and focus in particular on ICWs related to 
staffing (i.e., lack of accounting/internal control personnel) or an ineffective financial reporting information system 
(FRIS). The empirical test results provide evidence on the effect of CEO overconfidence on the effectiveness of 
ICFR and their investment of an appropriate level of resources to establish and maintain effective ICFR. 
 
Although CEOs are perceived as playing a critical role in ICFR effectiveness, recent accounting and finance 
literature on CEO overconfidence reports a negative impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate policies, such as 
investment decisions, accounting conservatism, and earnings management. For instance, Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) show that overconfident CEOs create inefficiencies in corporate investments. Ahmed and Duellman (2012) 
report that CEO overconfidence is negatively correlated with accounting conservatism. Moreover, Schrand and 
Zechman (2011) document that overconfident CEOs are more likely to be involved in earning management to cover 
up actual poor firm performance relative to their expectations, which was originally set up too optimistically. 
Therefore, when we consider that effective ICFR is the foundation for ensuring that accounting information from the 
financial reporting system is provided on a timely basis and is reliable, how CEO overconfidence—a psychological 
trait—affects the CEO’s role in establishing and maintaining effective ICFR is an important and interesting research 
question. In this study, I argue that CEO overconfidence is positively correlated to the existence of internal control 
deficiencies. This argument is primarily based on the findings of Schrand and Zechman (2011), who state that 
overconfident CEOs are more optimistic about their firm’s future performance. Their study also finds that, for firms 
whose actual performance is not anticipated to meet expectations, overconfident CEOs are more likely to conduct 
earning management to meet or beat such expectations. Because effective ICFR is more likely to deter overconfident 
CEOs’ earnings management, such CEOs may be less motivated to ensure effective ICFR. In addition, 
overconfident CEOs may pay less attention to the effectiveness of ICFR because they are more focused on 
overoptimistic future firm performance. Therefore, I posit that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
have ICWs that will subsequently be disclosed under Section 404(b) by their auditors. 
 
For the test, I use the same proxy for CEO overconfidence as that used in Schrand and Zechman (2011), where the 
variable for CEO overconfidence is measured at the firm level. Consistent with the previous prediction, for the 
sample firms that disclose ICWs under SOX Section 404(b) during 2004–2011, I find that CEO overconfidence is 
significantly and positively correlated with the existence of ICWs, after controlling for factors that affect internal 
control risk, such as firm size, financial risk, operating complexity, potential growth, and recent restructuring. 
Further analysis of the relationship between CEO overconfidence and types of ICWs shows that CEO 
overconfidence is significantly and positively associated with ICWs related to a lack of accounting personnel or 
ineffective FRIS. In addition, firms that disclose staffing- or FRIS-related ICWs have higher absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Collectively, these results suggest that overconfident CEOs are less likely to establish and 
maintain effective ICFR. Moreover, the results implicitly indicate that the negative association between CEO 
overconfidence and ICWs is attributable to lower investment in the ICFR infrastructure, such as accounting 
personnel or FRIS, subsequently producing lower quality of financial reporting. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and hypothesis development. The research 
design and empirical model are described in section 3. In section 4, I present the sample data. In section 5, the 
empirical results are documented. In the last section, the summary and conclusion are presented. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior Literature Review 
 
CEO Overconfidence 
 
Overconfidence, a cognitive bias, is described as a psychological bias of overestimating the future outcomes of 
current events. Overconfidence is primarily formed from the “better-than-average effect” (Svenson, 1981), which is 
the tendency for humans to think of themselves as “above average.” However, future outcomes overestimated by 
overconfident CEOs may be unrealistically too optimistic, which could negatively affect firms’ corporate policies or 
financial reporting decisions. 
 
Accordingly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overconfident CEOs lead to lower investment efficiency. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) also show that CEO overconfidence is positively associated with value-destroying 
mergers and acquisitions. In addition, Deshmukh et al. (2013) report that firms with overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to pay lower dividends. As a recent relevant study in the accounting literature, Schrand and Zechman (2011) 
use a 49-AAER sample and find that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting to meet or beat their overoptimistic earnings expectations. Additionally, Ahmed and Duellman (2012) 
document that firms with overconfident CEOs are less conservative with timely recognitions of losses. Presley and 
Abbott (2013) report that overconfident CEOs are more likely to restate previously reported financial statements.  
 
To summarize, relevant prior studies provide evidence that CEO overconfidence is negatively associated with a 
firm’s financial reporting quality through earnings management, accounting conservatism, and the restatement of 
previously reported financial statements. 
 
Internal Control Weaknesses 
 
Since the enactment of SOX Sections 302 and 404, accounting literature has extensively investigated the association 
between the disclosure requirement and the financial reporting system: the characteristics of firms disclosing ICWs 
or the consequences of disclosed ICWs. Studies on the presence of ICWs reveal that business complexity, sales 
growth, operating loss, bankruptcy risk, auditor change, or auditor size is positively associated with the existence of 
ICWs (Ge and McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007a; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007; 
Ogneva et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2007; Bedard et al., 2009). Meanwhile, firm size, return on assets, or firm age is 
negatively associated with the presence of ICWs (Ge and McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 
2007a; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007; Ogneva et al., 2007). Additionally, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) and 
Hoitash et al. (2009) show that the presence of ICWs is positively associated with the number of audit committee 
meetings but negatively associated with the proportion of accounting financial experts on audit committees. 
 
In addition, extensively investigated are the consequences of disclosed ICWs. The relevant study primarily examines 
the association between the existence of ICWs and earnings quality, market reaction, cost of debt (equity), or 
earnings forecasts. Doyle et al. (2007b) show that firms with material weaknesses over ICFR have lower cash flow 
predictability, higher discretionary accruals, lower accruals quality, more frequent historical earnings restatements, 
or lower earnings persistence. Using disclosures under Section 404, Ogneva et al. (2007) and Chan et al. (2009) 
report that firms with material weaknesses in ICFRs have more absolute discretionary accruals. Ashbaugh-Skife et 
al. (2008) document that firms with ICWs have larger absolute total and working accruals, and firms that remediate 
their identified material weaknesses in ICFRs report improved accruals quality. Furthermore, markets react 
adversely to the disclosure of ICWs under Section 302 or 404 (Beneish et al., 2008; Hammersley et al., 2008; 
Ashbaugh-Skife et al., 2009; Kim and Park, 2009). Additionally, Ashbaugh-Skife et al. (2009) report that firms with 
ICWs have higher costs of equity. Feng et al. (2009) show that firms with material weaknesses in ICFR under 
Section 404 have less accurate management forecasts. 
 
Taken together, the prior literature suggests that ICW disclosures negatively affect financial reporting quality. 
Simultaneously, markets and financial analysts adversely perceive the disclosure of ICWs.  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 84 The Clute Institute 
Hypothesis Development 
 
As previously discussed, SOX Section 302 explicitly proscribes that CEOs are responsible for establishing and 
maintaining effective ICFR, and disclosures of ICWs negatively affect financial reporting quality. Additionally, 
markets and financial analysts adversely perceive disclosure of ICWs. To summarize, CEOs are at the center of the 
relation between effective ICFR and financial reporting quality, suggesting that CEO overconfidence affects the 
effectiveness of a firm’s ICFR. In this study, I expect that overconfident CEOs are more likely to knowingly or 
unknowingly place less emphasis on the importance of ICFR effectiveness. 
 
On the one hand, overconfident CEOs may unknowingly disregard the importance of effective ICFR. Using evidence 
from a prior study that finds that CEO overconfidence—a cognitive bias—primarily adversely affects firm value 
through inefficiencies in investment outcomes or value-destroying mergers and acquisitions, I argue that 
overconfident CEOs are likely to pay less attention to the importance of effective ICFR compared with non-
overconfident CEOs because of too strong a focus on their overoptimistic future performance. On the other hand and 
more importantly, as documented in Schrand and Zechman (2011), overconfident CEOs are more likely to be 
involved in earning management to beat or meet their overoptimistic earnings forecasts. This finding suggests that 
overconfident CEOs are less likely to be motivated to establish and maintain effective internal controls considering 
that effective ICFR is more likely to deter earnings management efforts by such CEOs. 
 
Therefore, I hypothesize as follows (at the alternative form). 
 
Hypothesis 1: CEO overconfidence is positively associated with the existence of internal control weaknesses.  
 
Next, I use types of ICWs to examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on investments in ICFR effectiveness. 
Overall, material weaknesses exist at the account (transaction) level and at the company level. Account-level 
material weaknesses represent those caused by a lack of controls over accounting, documentation, or applications of 
specific accounts or transactions, such as accounts receivables and inventories. Company-level material weaknesses 
are those that affect the overall effectiveness of ICFR, such as insufficient staffing in charge of the financial 
reporting system and ineffective FRIS. Consistent with the reasoning in Hypothesis 1, I expect that overconfident 
CEOs are less likely to invest adequate resources to establish and maintain effective ICFR. Such a lack of 
investment in ICFR infrastructure is more likely to cause company-level material weaknesses related to staffing or 
ineffective FRIS.    
 
Therefore, I hypothesize as follows (at the alternative form). 
 
Hypothesis 2: CEO overconfidence is negatively associated with investments that establish and maintain effective 
internal control over financial reporting.  
 
Lastly, I reinvestigate the financial reporting quality of firms whose overconfident CEOs fail to invest sufficient 
resources to establish and maintain effective ICFRs compared with firms with non-overconfident CEOs and 
effective ICFRs. Prior literature (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b; Ogneva et al., 2007; Chan et al., 2009; Ashbaugh-Skife et 
al., 2009) provides collective evidence that firms disclosing internal control deficiencies are more likely to have 
inferior financial reporting quality, such as higher discretionary accruals, lower accruals quality, more historical 
earnings restatements, lower earnings persistence, or higher costs of equity. In addition, insufficient investments in 
the infrastructure of effective ICFR primarily result in company-level material weaknesses that more severely affect 
financial reporting quality than account-level material weaknesses.  
 
Taken together, I expect that firms with overconfident CEOs that fail to make adequate investments for effective 
ICFR are more likely to produce lower earnings quality. 
 
Therefore, I develop the following hypothesis (in the alternative form). 
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Hypothesis 3: Compared with firms with non-overconfident CEOs and that disclose no internal control deficiencies, 
firms with overconfident CEOs who fail to appropriately invest their resources to establish and maintain effective 
internal control over financial reporting are more likely to have lower earnings quality.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To test the hypotheses of the impact of managerial overconfidence on the existence of ICWs or infrastructure 
investments for effective ICFR, I use the following logit model. 
 
ICW (or Staffing/FRIS)it=β0+β1*CEO_OCit+β2*Foreign_OPit+β3*M&Ait 
                   +β4*Restructureit+β5*Salesgrowthit+β6*Sizeit+β7*Lossit 
                   +β8*Bankzit+β9*Restatementit+β10*Big 4it 
                   +β11*Litigation riskit+ εit                                                                      (1) 
 
where: 
 
ICW = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. 
Staffing = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to staffing (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal 
control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. 
FRIS = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to ineffective financial reporting information 
system under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_OC = coded 1 if the CEO of a firm is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign_OP = coded 1 if a firm operates a foreign operation, and 0 otherwise. 
M&A = coded 1 if a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise. 
Restructure = coded 1 if a firm is involved in a restructuring, and 0 otherwise. 
Salesgrowth = growth rate in sales, measured as (sales in the current fiscal year-sales in the previous fiscal year)/sales in 
the previous fiscal year, 
Size = coded 1 if a firm reports net loss for the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Loss = coded 1 if a firm reports net loss for the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Bankz = bankruptcy score (Zmijewski 1984), measured as -4.803-3.599*(net income/total assets)+5.406*(total 
liabilities/total assets)-0.100*(current assets/current liabilities) 
Restatement = coded 1 if a firm reports that they restated previously issued financial statements in the current fiscal year, 
and 0 otherwise 
Big4 = coded 1 if a firm’s auditor is one of PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG, and 0 otherwise. 
Litigation risk = coded 1 if a firm belongs to a litigious industry-SIC code 2833 to 2836, SIC code 3570 to 3577, SIC code 
3600 to 3674, SIC code 5200 to 5961, SIC code 7370 to 7374, or SIC code 8731 to 8734, and 0 otherwise.  
 
In Model (1), CEO_OC, a proxy for CEO overconfidence, is measured using firm characteristics based on Schrand 
and Zechman (2011). CEO_OC, a time-invariant measure, is measured at the firm level using five components from 
the study of Schrand and Zechman (2011): 1) excess investment, 2) net acquisition, 3) debt-to-equity ratio, 4) risk 
debt, and 5) dividend yield.3 The first three components are equal to 1 if each measure is in the top quartile of firms 
in a certain three-digit SIC code for a year. The last two components, risk debt and dividend yield, equal 1 if a firm 
uses risk debt or does not pay a dividend, respectively. The measurement procedure is as follows. First, 
CEO_OC_firm_based is set to 1 if the sum of the five dummy variables previously described is greater than 2 in a 
year. The use of CEO overconfidence measures (e.g., Schrand and Zechman, 2011) at the firm level is rationalized 
because prior studies on CEO overconfidence documents that CEO overconfidence is positively correlated with 
excessive investments (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Ben-David et al., 2007), a value-destroying merger 
and acquisition (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008), preference for debt over equity (e.g., Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 
2008) or long-term risky debt (e.g., Malmendier et al., 2011; Ben-David et al., 2007), and is negatively correlated 
with dividend payment (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2007). 
 
Using CEO_OC_firm_based as previously measured for CEO overconfidence, I create a test variable, CEO_OC, 
following Malmendier and Tate (2005). I assume that once a CEO exhibits overconfidence for the measures of 
                                                
3 Refer to Schrand and Zechman (2011) for more details on the definition of each of the five components and its measurement process. 
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CEO_OC, the CEO is then regarded as overconfident. Therefore, CEO_OC is set to 1 during the rest of the sample 
period since the first year in which a dummy variable of CEO_OC_firm_based for the CEO’s firm is equal to 1. 
 
Next, I control for the factors that affect the existence of ICWs and the incentives to discover and report them. First, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) document that the existence of ICWs is positively associated with operational 
complexity and changes in the organizational structure. Thus, I control for the existence of foreign operation(s) 
(Foreign_OP) and the involvement of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and restructuring activities (Restructure). I 
also add Salesgrowth to control for this operating characteristic of firms because Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) 
report that faster-growing firms are more likely to have ICWs. Another factor affecting the existence of ICWs is 
whether or not firms have adequate resources to invest in and establish and maintain their effective ICFRs. Larger, 
profitable, or financially stable firms are expected to be less likely to have ICWs. Therefore, I control for firm size 
(Size), firm losses (Loss), and bankruptcy probability (Bankz). Finally, I include factors related to incentives to 
discover and report ICWs. Restatement is strongly and positively associated with ICWs. Management of firms that 
restate previous financial statements is perceived to have an incentive to discover and report relevant ICWs. Big 4 
auditors have incentives to disclose identified ICWs (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Additionally, management of 
firms with greater litigation risk is more likely to report identified ICWs to avoid potential litigation risk, which is 
measured by whether a firm runs its business in litigious industries. Thus, I control for Restatement, Big4, and 
Litigation risk. 
 
Lastly, to test Hypothesis 3, I examine the impact of CEO overconfidence and a lack of investments needed to 
establish and maintain effective ICFR on earnings quality, which is proxied as discretionary accruals and accruals 
quality. First I explore the association between CEO overconfidence and ICWs and discretionary accruals using two 
measures of discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005)’s performance-controlled model and modified 
Jones (1991) model. The measurement procedure of discretionary accruals based on performance-controlled model 
is as follows. First, I cross-sectionally estimate the coefficients of model (2) for firms with no ICWs by year and 
two-digit SIC code. 
 
TACCit/Ait-1=α1(1/Ait-1)+α2(∆REVit-1-∆RECit-1)/Ait-1+α3(PPEit-1/Ait-1)+α4ROAit-1+εit          (2) 
 
where TACCit represents discretionary accruals, measured by IBEXit-CFOit using a cash flow approach (Hribar and 
Collins, 2002) where IBEXit represents earnings before extraordinary items for firm i in year t, and CFOit represents 
cash flows from operations for firm i in year t, ∆REVit represents revenues in year t less revenues in year t–1, ∆RECit 
represents receivables in year t less revenues in year t–1, PPEit represents gross property, plant, and equipment, and 
Ait-1 represents lagged total assets. ROAit represents return on assets measured using IBEXit divided by lagged total 
assets. Then, these previously estimated coefficients are used to compute discretionary accruals (DA) in the 
following model for the ICWs sample firms in this study. 
 
DAit=TACCit –[ā1(1/Ait-1)+ā2(∆REVit-1-∆RECit-1)/Ait-1+ā3(PPEit-1/Ait-1)+ā4ROAit-1]          (3) 
 
where DAit represents discretionary accruals (DA), which are calculated by subtracting non-discretionary accruals 
from total accruals. Next, to compute discretionary accruals based on modified Jones (1991) model, I re-conduct the 
measurement procedures in Models (2) and (3) without ROA. 
 
To test the association of CEO overconfidence and ICWs with discretionary accruals, I establish Model (4) as 
follows: 
 
ABS(DA_KO) or ABS(DA_MJ)it=β0+β1*OC_Staffing (OC_IFRS)it+β2*Sizeit 
           +β3*CFOit+β4*Loss+β5*BTM+β6*Salesgrowth+β7*Bankzit 
                +β8*ABS(TACC)+εit                                                                                             (4) 
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where: 
 
ABS(DA_KO) = Absolute value of discretionary accruals, measured by performance-controlled model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
ABS(DA_MJ) = Absolute value of discretionary accruals, measured by modified Jones (1991) model. 
OC_Staffing = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to staffing (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal 
control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
OC_FRIS = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to ineffective financial reporting 
information system under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
CFO = Cash flows from operations, deflated by total assets. 
Lev = The ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets. 
BTM = The ratio of book value of equity to market capitalization, measured by multiplying the number of 
outstanding shares by stock price. 
ABS(TACC) = Absolute value of earnings before extraordinary items less cash flows from operations, deflated by lagged 
total assets. 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, I reproduced two variables of interest: OC_Staffing and OC_FRIS. OC_Staffing is coded 1 if a 
firm discloses ICWs related to staffing (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal control personnel) under SOX Section 
404(b) and its CEO is overconfident. OC_FRIS is coded 1 if a firm discloses ICWs related to an ineffective FRIS 
under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident. Additionally, I created three sub-samples from the full 
sample. Sub-sample 1 (n=185) consists of firms that disclose ICWs related to staffing (i.e., a lack of 
accounting/internal control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b) and have overconfident CEOs. Sub-sample 2 
(n=75) consists of firms that disclose ICWs related to an ineffective FRIS under SOX Section 404(b) and have 
overconfident CEOs. Sub-sample 3 (n=2,586) consists of firms that do not disclose ICWs and have non-
overconfident CEOs. The first two sub-samples are test samples and the last one represents the control sample. Each 
test sub-sample is merged with the control sample for the regression analysis. 
 
In Model (4), I use the absolute value of the discretionary accruals (Abs(DA)) as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Discretionary accruals represent one of the most popular proxies for earnings management. In this study, 
this proxy is measured using a performance-adjusted model (Kothari et al., 2005). In addition, following prior 
studies (e.g., Reynolds and Francis, 2000; Becker et al., 1998; Warfield et al., 1995), I control for firm size (Size), 
cash flows from operations (CFO), loss firms (Loss), growth opportunity (BTM), growth rate (Salesgrowth), 
financial stability (Bankz), and absolute value of total accruals (Abs(Tacc)).   
 
Lastly, accruals quality is another popular proxy for earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 
2011). To compute each firm’s residual and its industry mean residual, I cross-sectionally estimate Model (5), which 
is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), by year and two-digit SIC code. Accrual Quality is defined as the absolute 
value of firm residual minus industry mean residual in year t, estimated in Model (5). 
 
∆WCAit = c0 + c1CFOit-1 + c2CFOit + c3CFOit+1 + c4ΔREVit + c5PPEit + εit           (5) 
 
where WCA represents working capital accruals measured as ((Δcurrent assets – Δcash and cash equivalents)-
(Δcurrent liabilities –Δshort-term liabilities)), CFO represents operating cash flows, ΔREV represents change in 
sales, and PPE represents the gross amount of property, plant, and equipment. All variables in model (5) are deflated 
by average total assets. Following McNichlos (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), I also include the change in sales 
(ΔREV) and the level of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) in year t. 
 
To test the association of CEO overconfidence and ICWs with accruals quality, I establish Model (6) as follows: 
 
Accruals Qualityit=β0+β1*OC_Staffing(OC_IFRS)it+β2*Sizeit+β3*CFOit+β4*Loss 
              +β5*BTM+β6*Salesgrowthit+β7*Bankzit+β8*ABS(TACC)it+εit     (6)  
 
where: 
 
Accruals Quality = Absolute value of firm residual minus industry mean residual in year t, estimated in the model by year 
and two-digit SIC code: ∆WCAit = c0 + c1CFOit-1 + c2CFOit + c3CFOit+1 + c4ΔREVit + c5PPEit + εit. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 88 The Clute Institute 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
The sample period for this study is 2004 to 2011. Data for ICWs, CEOs, and financial variables are collected from 
the Audit Analytics database, the Execucomp database, and the Compustat database. An initial sample from Audit 
Analytics comprises 32,503 firm-year observations that disclose the effectiveness of ICFR under SOX Section 
404(b) during the sample period. Then, merging the initial sample with CEO overconfidence and financial variables 
results in the deletion of 23,570 firm-year observations given missing CEO overconfidence or financial variables. 
The final sample contains 8,933 firm-year observations consisting of 495 (8,438) firm-year observations that (did 
not) disclosed ICWs under SOX Section 404(b). Table 1 panel A summarizes the sample selection procedures. 
 
Table 1. Sample 
Panel A. Sample Selection Procedure 
Description Sample 
Firms with an audit opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting under SOX 
Section 404(b) between 12/15/2004 and 12/31/2011, from Audit Analytics 
32,503 
Firms with missing CEO overconfidence or financial variables (23,570) 
Final Sample 8,438 
ICW firms 495 
No ICW firms 8,933 
 
Panel B. Industry Distribution 
Industry (SIC Codes) Full Sample ICW No ICW N % N % N % 
Agriculture (100-999) 27 0.3 2 0.4 25 0.3 
Mining and Construction (1000-1299, 1400-1999) 156 1.8 9 1.8 147 1.7 
Food (2000-2199) 246 2.8 6 1.2 240 2.8 
Textiles, Printing & Publishing (2200-2799) 495 5.5 28 5.7 467 5.5 
Drugs & Medical Equipment (2830-2839, 3840-3851) 732 8.2 35 7.1 697 8.3 
Chemicals (2800-2829, 2840-2899) 310 3.5 10 2.0 300 3.6 
Refining and Extractive (1300-1399, 2900-2999)  416 4.7 16 3.2 400 4.7 
Rubber, Leather, and Metal (3000-3499) 485 5.4 18 3.6 467 5.5 
Industrial Equipment (3500-3569, 3580-3659) 512 5.7 22 4.4 490 5.8 
Electrical Equipment (3660-3669, 3680-3699) 256 2.9 28 5.7 228 2.7 
Miscellaneous Equipment (3700-3839, 3852-3999) 637 7.1 41 8.3 596 7.1 
Computers (3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379) 1,448 16.2 111 22.4 1,337 15.8 
Transportation (4000-4899) 490 5.5 32 6.5 458 5.4 
Utilities (4900-4999) 513 5.7 17 3.4 496 5.9 
Retail (5000-5999) 1,117 12.5 63 12.7 1,054 12.5 
Banks (6000-6999) 274 3.1 12 2.4 262 3.1 
Services (7000-7369, 7380-8999) 806 9.0 41 8.3 765 9.1 
Miscellaneous (9000-9999) 13 0.2 4 0.8 9 0.1 
Total 8,933 100 495 100 8,438 100 
 
Panel C. Sample by Year 
 ICW No ICW  
N (%) N (%) Total 
2004 89 18.0 657 7.8 746 
2005 130 26.3 1,015 12.0 1,145 
2006 87 17.6 1,089 12.9 1,176 
2007 79 16.0 1,144 13.5 1,223 
2008 47 9.5 1,179 14.0 1,226 
2009 23 4.6 1,180 14.0 1,203 
2010 18 3.6 1,130 13.4 1,148 
2011 22 4.4 1,044 12.4 1,066 
N 495 100 8,438 100 8,933 
 
Table 1 Panel B exhibits the industry distribution of full sample firms, including 495 ICW sample firm-year 
observations that report ineffective internal controls under SOX Section 404(b). According to Table 1 Panel B, out 
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of the 495 ICW sample firm-year observations, 111 (22.6%) sample firm-year observations within the computer 
industry report ICWs, which is the most frequent, followed by retail (12.5%), service (8.3%), miscellaneous 
equipment (8.3%), drug & medical equipment (7.1%).4 Table 1 Panel C presents the yearly distribution of the full 
sample based on internal control effectiveness. This distribution shows that the enactment of SOX Section 404(b) in 
2004 resulted in an increase in firms that disclose ineffective internal controls, from 89 in 2004 to 130 in 2005. 
However, in 2006, firms with ineffective internal controls decreased to 87; since then, the number of firms that 
report ineffective internal controls has decreased every year until 2010. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 2 Panel A reports the mean and median differences of all of the independent variables used in the empirical 
model between firms that report effective or ineffective ICFR (i.e., material weakness) under SOX Section 404(b). 
As shown in columns 2, 3, and 6 in Table 2 Panel A, the mean (0.71) of CEO_OC for firms with ineffective ICFR is 
greater than that (0.66) of those with effective ICFR, and the mean difference is significant at the 5 percent level (t-
statistics=2.05), suggesting that firms managed by overconfident CEOs are more likely to have ineffective ICFRs. 
All of the control variables (i.e., Foreign_OP, Restructure, Size, Loss, Bankz, Restatement, Litigation risk) except 
for M&A, Salesgrowth, and Big4, have the expected signs and are significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast to my 
expectations, M&A and Big4 are negative and significant at the 1 percent level. As expected, Salesgrowth is positive 
but insignificant. The results of the median difference test are presented in columns 4, 5, and 7 in Table 2 Panel A, 
and are very similar to those from the mean difference test. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Related to Internal Control Weaknesses 
Panel A. Internal Control Weaknesses and Determinants Affecting their Existence 
 Mean Median 
Mean 
Difference 
Median 
Difference 
ICW=1 ICW=0 ICW=1 ICW=0 t-statistics z-statistics 
CEO_OC 0.71 0.66 1 1 2.12** 2.05*** 
Control Variable     
Foreign_OP 0.76 0.68 1 1 3.95*** 3.66*** 
M&A 0.10 0.16 0 0 -4.63*** -3.82*** 
Restructure 0.46 0.39 0 0 2.73*** 2.73*** 
Sales_growth 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.97 0.81 
Size 6.81 7.50 6.70 7.31 -10.12*** -9.41*** 
Loss 0.36 0.16 0 0 9.26*** 11.70*** 
Bankz -1.85 -2.43 -2.22 -2.30 4.24*** 4.70*** 
Restatement 0.19 0.10 0 0 5.20*** 6.67*** 
Big4 0.88 0.93 1 1 -3.39*** -4.24*** 
Litigation risk 0.39 0.33 0 0 2.89*** 2.89*** 
No. of observations 495 8,438 495 8,438   
 
Panel B. CEO Overconfidence and Types of Internal Control Weaknesses 
 Mean Median Mean Difference 
Median 
Difference 
 CEO_OC=1 CEO_OC=0 CEO_OC=1 CEO_OC=0 t-statistics z-statistics 
Staffing 0.03 0.02 0 0 2.91*** 2.74*** 
FRIS 0.01 0.01 0 0 2.00** 1.87* 
No. of observations 5,957 2,976 5,957 2,976   
 
  
                                                
4 In addition, prior study (e.g., Johnson et al. 2001; Francis et al. 1994) documents that those industries such as computer (including SIC codes 
3570-3577, 7370-7374), retail (including SIC codes 5200-5961), service (including SIC codes 8731-8734), drug & medical equipment (including 
SIC codes 2833-2836) are considered highly litigious ones. Thus, the industries are included in ICW existence model in this study.   
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(Table 2 continued) 
Panel C. CEO Overconfidence/Staffing- or FRIS-Related ICWs and Discretionary Accruals/Accruals Quality 
 Mean Mean Diff. Mean Mean Diff. 
 OC_Staffing=1 OC_Staffing=0 t-statistics OC_FRIS=1 OC_FRIS=0 t-statistics 
ABS(DA_KO) 0.07 0.05 2.48*** 0.07 0.05 1.44 
ABS(DA_MJ) 0.08 0.06 3.04*** 0.09 0.06 2.51** 
Accruals Quality a 0.06 0.04 3.91*** 0.05 0.04 2.85*** 
CFO 0.03 0.12 -5.09*** 0.04 0.12 -8.42*** 
BTM 0.56 0.46 1.07 0.43 0.46 -0.41 
ABS(TACC) 0.09 0.08 2.43** 0.09 0.08 1.16 
No. of observations 185 2,586  75 2,586  
 
 
where: 
 
CEO_OC = coded 1 if the CEO of a firm is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
ICW = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. 
Staffing = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to staffing (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal 
control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. 
FRIS = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to ineffective financial reporting 
information system under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. 
OC_Staffing = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to staffing (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal 
control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
OC_FRIS = coded 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses related to ineffective financial reporting 
information system under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign_OP = coded 1 if a firm operates a foreign operation, and 0 otherwise. 
M&A = coded 1 if a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise. 
Restructure  coded 1 if a firm is involved in a restructuring, and 0 otherwise. 
Salesgrowth = growth rate in sales, measured as (sales in the current fiscal year-sales in the previous fiscal year)/sales in 
the previous fiscal year, 
Size = coded 1 if a firm reports net loss for the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Loss = coded 1 if a firm reports net loss for the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Bankz = bankruptcy score (Zmijewski 1984), measured as -4.803-3.599*(net income/total assets)+5.406*(total 
liabilities/total assets)-0.100*(current assets/current liabilities) 
Restatement = coded 1 if a firm reports that they restated previously issued financial statements in the current fiscal year, 
and 0 otherwise 
Big4 = coded 1 if a firm’s auditor is one of PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG, and 0 otherwise. 
Litigation risk = coded 1 if a firm belongs to a litigious industry-SIC code 2833 to 2836, SIC code 3570 to 3577, SIC code 
3600 to 3674, SIC code 5200 to 5961, SIC code 7370 to 7374, or SIC code 8731 to 8734, and 0 otherwise.  
ABS(DA_KO) = Absolute value of discretionary accruals, measured by performance-controlled model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
ABS(DA_MJ) = Absolute value of discretionary accruals, measured by modified Jones (1991) model. 
Accruals 
Quality 
= Absolute value of firm residual minus industry mean residual in year t, estimated in the model by year and 
two-digit SIC code: ∆WCAit = c0 + c1CFOit-1 + c2CFOit + c3CFOit+1 + c4ΔREVit + c5PPEit + εit. 
CFO = Cash flows from operations, deflated by total assets. 
BTM = The ratio of book value of equity to market capitalization, measured by multiplying the number of 
outstanding shares by stock price. 
ABS(TACC) = Absolute value of earnings before extraordinary items less cash flows from operations, deflated by lagged 
total assets. 
a For Accruals Quality test, the size of each sub-sample is varied due to missing values: 1) n=174 for OC_Staffing=1, 2) n=2,504 for 
OC_Staffing=0, 3) n=72 for OC_FRIS=1, 4) n=2,504 for OC_FRIS=0. 
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). 
 
Table 2 Panel B exhibits the test results of the mean and median differences between CEO overconfidence and types 
of ICWs (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal control personnel or ineffective FRIS). I find that the mean or median 
differences between CEO overconfidence (CEO_OC) and Staffing and FRIS are positive and significant at the 1, 5, 
or 10 percent levels, suggesting that firms with overconfident CEOs are less likely to invest to establish and 
maintain effective ICFR. Table 2 Panel C reports the mean difference test results for the discretionary accruals, 
accruals quality, and control variables used in the discretionary accrual and accruals quality models between firms 
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(n=185(75)) with overconfident CEOs and staffing- (or FRIS-) related ICWs and firms (n=2,586) without 
overconfident CEOs and any ICWs. The results indicate that firms with overconfident CEOs and staffing-related 
ICWs (OC_Staffing=1) are more likely to have higher absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS(DA_KO) or 
ABS(DA_MJ)) and lower accruals quality (Accruals Quality), providing preliminary evidence that these firms are apt 
to opportunistically behave to manage earnings, producing lower quality of accruals. Additionally, I find that firms 
with overconfident CEOs and FRIS-related ICWs (OC_FRIS=1) have higher absolute discretionary accruals that are 
not significant at the conventional level and lower quality of accruals. In addition, I find that firms with 
overconfident CEOs and staffing- or FRIS-related ICWs are more likely to have lower cash flows from operations 
(CFO). 
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In addition, Table 3 exhibits the results of the correlation analysis, which show positive and significant (p-value: 0.04, <0.01, and 0.06, respectively) correlations 
(0.02, 0.03, and 0.02, respectively) between ICW, Staffing, or FRIS and CEO_OC. In contrast to my expectations, as suggested in the results of the mean 
difference test in Table 2, ICW is negatively correlated with M&A or Big4 at the 1 percent level, but the magnitudes are low (–0.04). The other correlations 
between CEO_OC and each of the independent variables are less than 0.4. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix for Variables Used in the ICW Model 
Variable Staffing FRIS CEO_OC Foreign_ OP M&A Restructure 
Sales 
growth Size Loss Bankz Restatement Big 4 
Litigation 
risk 
ICW 0.72 (<0.01) 
0.45 
(<0.01) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(<0.01) 
-0.04 
(<0.01) 
0.03 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.10 
(<0.01) 
0.12 
(<0.01) 
0.08 
(<0.01) 
0.07 
(<0.01) 
-0.04 
(<0.01) 
0.03 
(<0.01) 
Staffing  0.48 (<0.01) 
0.03 
(<0.01) 
0.04 
(<0.01) 
-0.03 
(<0.01) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.07 
(<0.01) 
0.10 
(<0.01) 
0.09 
(<0.01) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
-0.05 
(<0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
FRIS   0.02 (0.06) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
-0.05 
(<0.01) 
0.07 
(<0.01) 
0.07 
(<0.01) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
-0.11 
(<0.01) 
0.00 
(0.66) 
CEO_OC    0.11 (<0.01) 
0.15 
(<0.01) 
0.10 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
0.10 
(<0.01) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
0.13 
(<0.01) 
0.00 
(<0.89) 
0.04 
(<0.01) 
0.09 
(<0.01) 
Foreign_OP     0.10 (<0.01) 
0.29 
(<0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(<0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.12 
(<0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
M&A      0.12 (<0.01) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(<0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.93) 
-0.00 
(0.86) 
-0.05 
(<0.01) 
0.04 
(<0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Restructure       -0.06 (<0.01) 
0.11 
(<0.01) 
0.19 
(<0.01) 
0.14 
(<0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
0.07 
(<0.01) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Salesgrowth        -0.04 (<0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(<0.01) 
0.00 
(0.75) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Size         -0.17 (<0.01) 
0.25 
(<0.01) 
-0.03 
(<0.01) 
0.30 
(<0.01) 
-0.17 
(<0.01) 
Loss          0.30 (<0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.96) 
-0.07 
(<0.01) 
0.04 
(<0.01) 
Bankz           -0.01 (0.57) 
0.11 
(<0.01) 
-0.17 
(<0.01) 
Restatement            -0.00 (0.91) 
-0.01 
(0.26) 
Big 4             -0.08 (<0.01) 
Note: The table reports Pearson correlations. P-values appear in parentheses.  Refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 93 The Clute Institute 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression to test Hypothesis 1 using the full sample (n=8,933). The 
dependent variable is the dummy variable ICW, which is coded 1 if a firm reports ineffective ICFR under SOX 
Section 404(b). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 present the logistic regression results of the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on the effectiveness of ICFR, where CEO_OC is measured at the firm level using five variables 
from Schrand and Zechman (2011) that represent the characteristics of firms with overconfident CEOs. Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient (0.19) of CEO_OC, a test variable, is positive and significant at the 
conventional level (t-statistic=1.82). Therefore, firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have ineffective 
ICFR.  
 
Table 4. Results of Logistic Regression of the Effect of CEO Overconfidence on Disclosures of Internal Control Effectiveness 
Variable Exp. Sign DV=ICW Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept ? -1.43*** -4.94 
CEO_OC ? 0.19* 1.82 
Foreign_OP + 0.51*** 4.38 
M&A + -0.53*** -3.31 
Restructure + 0.06 0.57 
Salesgrowth + 0.03 0.94 
Size - -0.26*** -7.16 
Loss + 0.71*** 6.16 
Bankz + 0.10*** 4.32 
Restatement + 0.78*** 6.31 
Big 4 + -0.10 -0.61 
Litigation risk + 0.12 1.23 
Max R-Square 8.48% 
Likelihood ratio 267.94*** 
Number of observations 8,933 
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed).  Refer to Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
The dependent variable is ICW, which is coded 1 if a firm discloses ICWs under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 
otherwise. CEO_OC is coded 1 if the CEO of a firm is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. Out of 8,933 firm-year 
observations, 495 (8,438) disclose (no) ICWs under SOX Section 404(b).  
 
Next, I test Hypothesis 2, which examines the impact of CEO overconfidence on investments in the infrastructure 
for effective ICFR. I use two proxies for these investments: 1) adequate accounting personnel (Staffing) and 2) 
effective financial reporting information system (FRIS). 
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Table 5. Results of Logistic Regression of the Effect of CEO Overconfidence on Internal  
Control Weaknesses Related to Staffing/Financial Reporting Information System 
  Model 1 
DV=Staffing 
Model 2 
DV=FRIS 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept ? -2.37*** -6.26 -3.00*** -5.44 
CEO_OC ? 0.32** 2.15 0.40* 1.66 
Foreign_OP + 0.86*** 5.07 0.50** 2.06 
M&A + -0.51** -2.41 -0.42 -1.23 
Restructure + -0.10 -0.75 -0.13 -0.61 
Salesgrowth + 0.04 1.03 0.04 0.73 
Size - -0.23*** -4.70 -0.09 -1.13 
Loss + 0.77*** 5.05 0.84*** 3.55 
Bankz + 0.13*** 4.63 0.14*** 3.95 
Restatement + 0.88*** 5.42 1.19*** 5.05 
Big4 + -0.36* -1.75 -1.67*** -6.42 
Litigation risk  + 0.18 1.30 -0.06 -0.25 
Max R-Square  9.54% 12.75% 
Likelihood ratio  199.31*** 136.28 
Number of observations  8,701 8,543 
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). Refer to Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
The dependent variables are Staffing and FRIS. Staffing is coded 1 if a firm discloses ICWs related to staffing (i.e., a 
lack of accounting/internal control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. FRIS is coded 1 if a firm 
discloses ICWs related to an ineffective FRIS under SOX Section 404(b), and 0 otherwise. CEO_OC is coded 1 if 
the CEO of a firm is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In Model 1, the number of firm-year observations is 8,701, consisting of 263 observations that disclose staffing-
related ICWs and 8,670 that disclose no ICWs. In Model 2, the number of firm-year observations is 8,438, 
consisting of 105 observations that disclose staffing-related ICWs and 8,438 that disclose no ICWs. 
 
Table 5 presents the logistic regression results. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report the results of the association 
between CEO overconfidence (CEO_OC) and Staffing, which show that the coefficient (0.33) of CEO_OC is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistics=2.21). This result suggests that firms with overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to experience a lack of accounting personnel given insufficient investment in staffing. 
Additionally, columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 present the results of the association between CEO overconfidence 
(CEO_OC) and FRIS, which shows that the coefficient (0.40) of CEO_OC is positive and marginally significant (t-
statistic=1.69). This result suggests that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have an ineffective FRIS, 
which may subsequently raise doubt over the overall reliability of the financial reporting system. 
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Table 6. Results of Regression on the Effect of CEO Overconfidence/Internal Control  
Weaknesses Related to Staffing/Financial Reporting Information System on Discretionary Accruals 
 DV=ABS(DA_KO) DV=ABS(DA_MJ) 
 OC_Staffing=1 OC_FRIS=1 OC_Staffing=1 OC_FRIS=1 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
Intercept ? 0.09*** 
(3.36) 
0.04*** 
(4.76) 
0.04*** 
(3.63) 
0.06*** 
(6.23) 
OC_Staffing ? 0.01* 
(1.81) 
 0.01** 
(2.12) 
 
OC_FRIS ?  0.02*** 
(2.72) 
 0.02*** 
(2.62) 
Size + -0.01
*** 
(-4.09) 
-0.00*** 
(-5.01) 
-0.00** 
(-2.47) 
-0.00*** 
(-3.79) 
CFO - -0.04 (-0.84) 
0.04 
(1.34) 
-0.17*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.19*** 
(-8.19) 
Loss ? -0.03
*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.01** 
(-2.14) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.03*** 
(-5.57) 
BTM - -0.00
** 
(-2.08) 
-0.00** 
(-2.55) 
-0.00* 
(-1.38) 
-0.00 
(-1.20) 
Growth + 0.00 (1.20) 
0.00* 
(1.33) 
0.00*** 
(2.41) 
0.00** 
(2.07) 
Bankz - 0.00 (0.84) 
-0.00*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.00*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.00*** 
(-2.66) 
Abs(Tacc) + 0.37*** 
(8.11) 
0.37*** 
(7.61) 
0.56*** 
(11.83) 
0.55*** 
(11.46) 
Adj. R-Square  29.17% 32.09% 39.30% 38.64% 
No. of observations  2,771 2,661 2,771 2,661 
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). All statistics and significance levels are based on standard errors adjusted 
by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels.  Refer to Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
The dependent variable is ABS(DA_KO), absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using a performance-
controlled model, as in Kothari et al. (2005). ABS(DA_MJ), absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using 
modified Jones (1991) model. OC_Staffing is coded 1 if a firm discloses ICWs related to staffing (i.e., a lack of 
accounting/internal control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
OC_FRIS is coded 1 if a firm discloses ICWs related to an ineffective FRIS under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO 
is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In Model 1, the number of firm-year observations is 2,771, consisting of 185 (OC_Staffing=1) observations that 
disclose a lack of accounting personnel (Staffing=1) and overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=1) and 2,586 observations 
that disclose both non-overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=0) and no ICWs (ICW=0). In Model 2, the number of firm-
year observations is 2,661, consisting of 75 (OC_FRIS=1) observations that disclose an ineffective FRIS and 
overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=1) and 2,586 observations with both non-overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=0) and 
no ICWs (ICW=0). 
 
Finally, I test Hypothesis 3 by examining the association between CEO overconfidence and a lack of investment in 
the establishment and maintenance of effective ICFR and absolute value of discretionary accruals. Table 6 columns 
3 and 5 report the regression results on the difference in discretionary accruals between firms (n=185) with 
overconfident CEOs and ICWs related to staffing and firms (n=2,586) without overconfident CEOs and any ICWs, 
using performance-controlled model (Kothari et al. 2005) and modified Jones (1991) model, respectively. Consistent 
with prior studies, I find that the coefficients of OC_Staffing are positive and significant at the conventional or 5 
percent level, suggesting that firms whose CEOs are overconfident and that disclose staffing-related ICWs are more 
likely to manage earnings. Additionally, columns 4 and 6 in Table 6 report the difference in discretionary accruals 
between firms (n=85) with overconfident CEOs and ICWs related to financial reporting information system (FRIS) 
and firms (n=2,586) without overconfident CEOs and any ICWs. Consistently, I find that the coefficients of 
OC_FRIS are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that firms whose CEOs are overconfident 
and that disclose FRIS-related ICWs are more likely to conduct earnings management. In addition, I test Hypothesis 
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3 by examining the association between CEO overconfidence and a lack of investment in the establishment and 
maintenance of effective ICFR and accruals quality. Table 7 Model 1 reports the regression results on the difference 
in accruals quality between firms (n=174) with overconfident CEOs and ICWs related to staffing and firms 
(n=2,504) without overconfident CEOs and any ICWs. Consistent with prior studies, I find that the coefficient of 
OC_Staffing is positive and significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistics=2.46), suggesting that firms whose CEOs 
are overconfident and that disclose staffing-related ICWs are more likely to have lower quality of accruals. 
Additionally, Model 2 in Table 7 reports the difference in accruals quality between firms (n=72) with overconfident 
CEOs and ICWs related to financial reporting information system (FRIS) and firms (n=2,504) without overconfident 
CEOs and any ICWs. Consistently, I find that the coefficient of OC_FRIS is positive and significant at the 
conventional level (t-statistics=1.93), suggesting that firms whose CEOs are overconfident and that disclose FRIS-
related ICWs are more likely to have lower quality of accruals.  
 
Table 7. Results of Regression on the Effect of CEO Overconfidence/Internal Control  
Weaknesses Related to Staffing/Financial Reporting Information System on Accruals Quality 
 Model 1 
DV=Accruals Quality 
Model 2 
DV=Accruals Quality 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept ? 0.08*** 5.53 0.56*** 8.62 
OC_Staffing ? 0.01** 2.46   
OC_FRIS ?   0.01* 1.93 
Size + -0.00*** -4.82 -0.00*** -5.48 
CFO - -0.10*** -3.21 -0.05** -2.49 
Loss ? -0.01* -1.79 -0.00 -1.00 
BTM - -0.00 -1.08 -0.00* -1.44 
Growth + 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.85 
Bankz - 0.00 1.34 -0.00 -0.61 
Abs(Tacc) + 0.11*** 4.17 0.11*** 3.98 
Adj. R-Square  15.58% 7.88% 
Number of observations  2,678 2,576 
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). All statistics and significance levels are based on standard errors adjusted 
by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels. 
 
The dependent variable is Accruals Quality, absolute value of firm residual minus industry mean residual in year t, 
estimated in the model by year and two-digit SIC code: ∆WCAit = c0 + c1CFOit-1 + c2CFOit + c3CFOit+1 + c4ΔREVit + 
c5PPEit + εit. OC_Staffing is coded 1 if a firm discloses ICWs related to staffing (i.e., a lack of accounting/internal 
control personnel) under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. OC_FRIS is coded 1 if 
a firm discloses ICWs related to an ineffective FRIS under SOX Section 404(b) and its CEO is overconfident, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
In Model 1, the number of firm-year observations is 2,678, consisting of 174 (OC_Staffing=1) observations that 
disclose a lack of accounting personnel (Staffing=1) and overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=1) and 2,504 observations 
that disclose both non-overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=0) and no ICWs (ICW=0). In Model 2, the number of firm-
year observations is 2,576, consisting of 72 (OC_FRIS=1) observations that disclose an ineffective FRIS and 
overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=1) and 2,504 observations with both non-overconfident CEOs (CEO_OC=0) and 
no ICWs (ICW=0). 
 
To summarize, overall, firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have ineffective ICFR compared with 
firms with non-overconfident CEOs and, in particular, have ICWs related to insufficient accounting staffing or 
ineffective financial reporting information systems. Further, firms with overconfident CEOs and that disclose 
staffing- or FRIS-related ICWs are more likely to opportunistically manage earnings, producing lower quality of 
accruals. Collectively, these results suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are less likely to invest adequate 
resources (e.g., staffing, financial reporting information system) in implementing effective ICFR, subsequently 
producing lower earnings quality. 
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THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Psychologically, the overconfidence is a cognitive bias in which a person believes subjectively that his or her 
judgment or ability is better than that of an average person. From the viewpoint of corporate managers, 
overconfident CEOs are so overoptimistic that they overestimate future outcomes from current investment projects. 
Theoretically, such CEO overconfidence can result in either positive consequences such as success in innovation 
(e.g., Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012) or negative consequences such as value-destroying 
investments or mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). Also, Goel and Thakor (2008) 
provide theoretical evidence that overconfident CEOs “underinvest in information production”, which can lead to 
investment decision-making errors and in turn inefficient investments. In this study, consistent with the study of 
Goel and Thakor (2008), I find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to establish and maintain effective ICFR, 
which is critical to the reliability of financial information and in turn, the ineffective ICFR produces inferior 
earnings quality such as more discretionary accruals or less accruals reliability. When we consider that CEOs play a 
central role in setting up and achieving their firm’s objectives, those results imply that overconfident CEOs should 
be well monitored and directed to maximize the firm value by internal or external corporate governance.    
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I examine the association between CEO overconfidence and the effectiveness of ICFR. I find that CEO 
overconfidence is positively associated with the existence of ICWs and, in particular, with ICWs related to 
insufficient accounting personnel or ineffective FRIS. Moreover, I find that firms with overconfident CEOs and that 
disclose staffing- or FRIS-related ICWs are more inclined to opportunistically manage earnings, producing lower 
quality of accruals.  
 
Taken together, those findings suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are less likely to be motivated to invest 
sufficient resources in establishing and maintaining effective ICFR, leading to ineffective ICFR and, further, lower 
earnings quality.  
 
As suggested in prior finance literature on the impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate policy, in conclusion, the 
attitude of overconfident CEOs toward the importance of ICFR could negatively affect the firm’s infrastructure with 
respect to implementing an effective FRIS, thus producing less reliable financial information. Furthermore, 
potentially negative consequences could downgrade investors’ confidence regarding the credibility of financial 
statements. 
 
Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from public sources. 
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